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Elder Law
The Elderly and Patient Dumping
by George P. Smith II
A lthough patients in "right
to refuse medical treat-
ment" cases have trouble
terminating their medical
care, many persons have difficulty
obtaining medical care in the first
place because they are refused ad-
mission to hospitals. This problem
is termed "patient dumping."1
Also known as "demarketing of
services" or "management of patient
mix,"2 patient dumping refers to the
hospital practice of transferring or
refusing to treat persons who are
indigent, uninsured, or otherwise
undesirable to admit.' Patient
dumping has origins in the common
law no-duty rule.4 This rule pro-
vides that hospitals have no duty
to admit and treat all patients who
seek care and, in some cases, have
no duty even to specify reasons for
rejecting patients. 5 Hospitals often
"dump" patients who arrive at hos-
pital wards either without any
health insurance or with only Med-
icaid insurance-a program which
physicians know provides low reim-
bursement payments.
The economic pressures placed
upon hospitals over the past decade
increased the frequency of patient
dumping in cases falling under the
no-duty rule.6 This rule and the
ability of hospitals to refuse medi-
cal treatment have been limited by
the Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of
1986, 42 U.S.C. §1395dd (1994) and
the Emergency Medical Treatment
and Active Labor Act (EMTALA),42
U.S.C. §1395dd (1994)-an amend-
ment to COBRA.
In the final analysis, it will be
Respect for the
dignity and
autonomy of elderly
patients, as well as
the underlying
motive to help them,
must replace the
all-consuming
profit motive.
seen that the elderly will be secure
from the indignity of patient dump-
ing only when society and the
health care industry acknowledge
their inherent value as an impor-
tant segment of contemporary
American life.
EMTALA: Patient Dumping
and the Federal Response
Before COBRA and EMTALA lim-
ited a hospital's right to refuse
medical treatment to patients, the
common law's no-duty rule was re-
stricted only by four exceptions: 1)
once a hospital provides medical
care, it must do so nonnegligently;
2) once a person gains "patient" sta-
tus, the caregiver must aid and pro-
tect that patient; 3) where a person
relies upon a caregiver's custom of
providing emergency care, a duty to
provide that care exists; and 4) true
"emergency" cases obviate the no-
duty rule.7 Although it has been
asserted that the no-duty rule was
applied narrowly,' its application
was apparently widespread enough
to provoke Congress to pass
EMTALAY Before EMTALA, ex-
perts estimated that hospitals
dumped up to 250,000 patients a
year. 0
Congress recognized the public
need to reduce the incidence of pa-
tient dumping when it enacted CO-
BRA and EMTALA's anti-dumping
provisions." Section 1395 of
EMTALA provides in pertinent
part: "If a patient at a hospital has
an emergency medical condition
which has not been stabilized ...
the hospital may not transfer the
patient unless-the transfer is an
appropriate transfer to that facil-
ity." (42 U.S.C. §1395 (c)(1)(B)
(1994)). EMTALA applies to hospi-
tals that receive federal funds from
the Medicare and Medicaid pro-
grams, and provides for civil mon-
etary fines against participating
hospitals and physicians who vio-
late it.
2
Hospitals and physicians will vio-
late §1395 either "by failing to de-
tect the nature of the emergency
condition through inadequate
screening procedures, [or after de-
tecting the emergency nature of the
patient's condition,] by failing to
stabilize the condition before releas-
ing the plaintiff."12 However, a
threshold requirement needed to
protect a patient under EMTALA is
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that the patient must arrive at a
hospital's emergency room in an
emergency condition.14 In sum, then,
to plead a §1395 claim, a patient
must prove: 1) that he or she arrived
at a defendant hospital's emergency
room in an emergency condition;
and 2) either that the hospital failed
to screen the patient adequately in
order to determine an emergency
condition or that the hospital dis-
charged or transferred the patient
before the emergency condition had
passed.1
5
EMTALA's powers are broad. It
requires hospitals which execute
Medicare provider agreements with
the federal government to treat "all
human beings who enter their emer-
gency departments" in accordance
with the act's provisions.1 6 The act
is alleged to have such a "landslide
potential" that its reach in the area
of health law has been compared to
the pervasive Racketeering Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organization
statute in the area of business fraud
and corporate law.'
7
Statutory and Administrative
Shortcomings
EMTALA should serve to prevent
hospitals' dumping of uninsured and
underinsured persons who enter
emergency wards of hospitals. De-
spite its provisions, however, pa-
tient dumping continues, and judi-
cial enforcement of EMTALA
appears to be waning. Only nine per-
cent of the hospitals cited by the
Health Care Financing Administra-
tion (HCFA) for violating EMTALA
were punished.' Between 1986 and
1992, HCFA investigated 268 hos-
pitals for 302 EMTALA violations,
but only fined 17 of them.19
It has been suggested that
EMTALA is ineffective because it
has definitional flaws and enforce-
ment shortcomings. 20 Specifically,
because the statute's key words are
either defined vaguely or not defined
at all, courts juggle testimonies of
medical experts and extract their
own definitions.21 Oftentimes, the
legislative history of EMTALA has
been of value to judicial
decisionmaking-but it has also pro-
vided a basis for broadening the
statute's reach.22
Judicial constructions of
EMTALA's language remain prob-
lematic because the courts must in-
terpret the statute's undefined
terms and also apply those terms to
a particular hospital's practice. For
example, in Baber v. Hospital Cor-
poration of America, 977 F.2d 872
(1992), the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals had to interpret and apply
the undefined term, "appropriate
medical screening examination," to
determine whether a hospital vio-
lated EMTALA's §1395dd(e)(1)(A). 23
It determined that because Con-
gress left this term undefined, it
would scrutinize the phrase on a
case-by-case basis and, thus, not cre-
ate an a priori definition or struc-
ture a reasonableness standard for
interpreting the phrase, itself.
24
The Baber case illustrates how
EMTALA's statutory faults have
hampered its effectiveness. Other
courts have criticized EMTALA for
being plagued by "weasel words."
25
EMTALA fails to define-or defines
only vaguely-other key statutory
terms such as "emergency medical
condition" (42 U.S.C. §1395dd(e)(1)(A)
(1994)), "to stabilize" (42 U.S.C.
§1395dd(c)(1)(A) (1994)), and "reason-
able transfers."26 These terms, then,
become EMTALA's so-called Achil-
les' heels. EMTALA's flexible statu-
tory language may well be the cen-
tral reason why only nine percent of
hospitals that HCFA cites for
EMTALA violations receive actual
punishment.2 7
EMTALA's protections do not suf-
ficiently reassure those uninsured
elderly patients who seek hospital
care that they will be protected
against patient dumping. Although
elderly persons who have neither
Medicare nor private insurance may
have an increased risk of being
dumped, these individuals also may
be denied adequate emergency
medical treatment for other rea-
sons.28 For example, some unethical
physicians discriminate against per-
sons with diseases such as AIDS 29
and other physicians favor treating
patients with simple ailments over
patients with complex ones in order
to reduce their risks of malpractice. 0
Irregularities Within DHHS
While Congress created EMTALA
in order to curb the number of pa-
tients dumped by hospitals and phy-
sicians, it unfortunately provided
this statute with a faulty enforce-
ment mechanism. (42 U.S.C.
§1395dd(d) (1994)). To compound
EMTALA's inherent weaknesses,
the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (DHHS) has estab-
lished a record of very limited en-
forcement against hospitals and
physicians who violate it.3 1
One of EMTALA's most powerful
provisions included the right of
DHHS to suspend or terminate the
Medicare contract of a hospital
found to dump patients. (42 U.S.C.
§1395dd(d)(1)). Yet, when it realized
that suspending a hospital's Medi-
care contract would harm dispropor-
tionately those persons who depend
solely on Medicare, Congress re-
voked this power.12 Congress did,
however, leave intact the DHHS's
authority to fine ($50,000 per inci-
dent) physicians who violate know-
ingly EMTALA and hospitals who
violate negligently EMTALA. (42
U.S.C. §1395dd(d)(1)). Nevertheless,
it has been suggested that hospitals
faced with EMTALA fines continue
to dump indigent patients because
the fines issued by DHHS often are
less than the costs of the medical
care they refuse to give."
Strengthening EMTALA
To strengthen EMTALA's effec-
tiveness, Congress must clarify its
definitions and broaden its enforce-
ment mechanisms and the DHHS
must improve its own enforcement
procedures. Congress should model
EMTALA after state and local anti-
dumping programs. For example, in
California, a state law penalizes
hospitals which receive dumped pa-
tients but which fail to report the
dumping hospitals.14 Congress could
improve EMTALA enforcement by
developing a similar "failure to re-
port dumping hospitals" penalty for
those hospitals which accept the
dumped patients.
Congressional efforts could also
be undertaken to require hospitals
to follow the practice of a Texas pub-
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lie hospital which requires other
hospitals to telephone and secure
the acceptance of any patient they
wish to transfer to the public hospi-
tal.3 5 The hospital monitors the
transfers by recording all incoming
telephone calls.3 6 This hospital's
practice has reduced the number of
unstable patient transfers and
deaths related to transfers. 7
Crucial to the whole issue of
EMTALA coverage is whether hos-
pitals should retain both admitting
and exclusion powers or relinquish
the prerogative to an inept and in-
sensitive federal bureaucracy.3 8
Linked inextricably to this concern
is the ultimate question of whether
EMTALA will - over time - "in-
crease the number of lives saved, or
- more properly - raise them to a
level that justifies the public expen-
ditures."3
9
Ethical Obligations
to Treat the Elderly
In a society where the elderly are
more susceptible to illness and dis-
ability than any other age group,40
they "ought to command special at-
tention in matters pertaining to
health care."4' Clearly, access to hos-
pitals and health care resources is
an important concern to them.
42
Many in fact have Medicare, or pri-
vate insurance, or both; but many
others have neither. As with society
as a whole, the elderly population
is composed of persons having vari-
ous income levels, interests, and
needs.43 Even if society's ethical con-
sensus advocated unlimited access
to health care, health care provid-
ers still would be unlikely to provide
health care to persons unable to pay
for it. 44 Patient dumping and access
to health care remain prominent is-
sues for the elderly because elderly
persons typically are not economi-
cally productive. 45 Indeed, the popu-
lation of elderly is impoverished dis-
proportionately and disadvantaged
economically.
46
Some physicians and patients
have adopted a consumerist image
of the physician as an independent
contractor who sells his or her
knowledge and skill to patients who
demand care.47 This contractual
model of medical care48 overlooks
the moral and ethical considerations
inherent within an emergency pa-
tient-physician situation and be-
littles the idea that a doctor should
make "a correct technological (medi-
cal) choice consonant with a
patient's needs and desires."49 In
addition, for-profit hospitals face an
inelastic demand for services, which
contribute ultimately to their being
unresponsive to altruistic social
winds."'
Americans should be offended
particularly by hospitals dumping
elderly patients because the elderly
are characterized as recruited to
poverty after relatively decent work-
ing lives.1 An elderly person's "so-
cial worth" and corresponding
health care resource allocation
should not be determined by his or
her ability to be a rational con-
sumer 52 who has saved money to
purchase healthful retirement
years. Instead, health care should
be allocated by considering the fair-
ness to the persons who need care
the most-specifically, the sick and
indigent elderly.
Conclusion
When society allows health care
providers to operate and profit in
any community, an ethic of fairness
-which respects the wisdom, 3 self
respect, 4 and achievement of the
elderly-should be in place and, in-
deed, controlling." Respect for the
dignity and autonomy of elderly pa-
tients, as well as the underlying
motive to help them, must replace
the all consuming profit motive held
by both hospitals and physicians as
the lodestar for American health
care delivery. In order to reach this
goal, society should restrict medical
licenses to health care providers who
will care for the indigent elderly as
a condition for doing business with
the rest of society. Only then might
the incidence of dumping elderly
patients be diminished signifi-
cantly. E0
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